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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
pared in prior terminated litigation is afforded a qualified immunity
from discovery and can be defeated only if the party seeking discovery
can show "substantial need" and "undue hardship." In reference to
"opinion" work product material prepared in prior terminated litiga-
tion, its immunity from discovery remains absolute.
W.D.F.
Im. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Staggered Term Elections Do Not Unconstitutionally Dilute
Voting Power of Racial Minorities- Cherry v. County of New
Hanover, 489 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1973).
Members of the County Board of Commissioners and the County
Board of Education of New Hanover County, North Carolina, and of
the City Council of Wilmington, North Carolina, are elected for four
year terms. The terms are staggered so that one-half of the members
are elected every two years.' In Cherry v. County of New Hanover,
2
black citizens alleged that this staggered-term system diluted their
voting power in violation of their "constitutional right to elect mem-
bers of their race to public office." '3 The only evidence offered by the
plaintiffs in support of their claims was that although 20 to 25 per
cent of the population of the constituent areas was black, no black
had ever been elected to public office.' The district court dismissed
the suit, holding that the staggered voting system did not violate the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights.5 In a per curiam opinion, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed this decision!
The challenge to the staggered-term7 plan was apparently a novel
one. The court thus relied entirely upon the authority of cases in
which multi-member districting had been in question. The Fourth
Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Whitcomb v.
Cherry v. County of New Hanover, 489 F.2d 273 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1973).
2 489 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1973).




Staggered terms are apparently a means of preserving continuity in governmen-
tal bodies by assuring some hold-over seats at each election, as in the United States
Senate.
I A multi-member district is one that is represented by more than one official on
any one governmental body. Comment, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-At-
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Chavis as supporting the proposition that minorities have no "con-
stitutional right to elect members of their race to public office."'" In
Whitcomb, minority ghetto-dwellers had challenged a multi-member
legislative district plan on the basis that it unconstitutionally diluted
the voting power of the minority." The Court, however, found no
evidence of invidious discrimination 12 in spite of acknowledged criti-
cisms of multi-member districting. 3
In denying that the plaintiffs had suffered deprivation of their
constitutional rights, the Fourth Circuit in Cherry held that a valid
claim against an allegedly unconstitutional voting system must in-
clude certain types of allegations." Such allegations would be that
the plaintiffs' voting rights had been infringed 5 or that the chal-
lenged system had been designed purposely "to minimize or cancel
out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting
population"'" or to "further historically engrained racial discrimina-
tion." 7 The plaintiffs in Cherry, however, made no such allegations.
Large Election of Parish Officials Unconstitutionally Dilutes Voting Strength of Black
Voters Where There Persist the Effects of a State Policy That Has Historically Hind-
ered Participation of Blacks in Electoral Process, 26 ALA. L. REv. 163 n.4 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, 26 ALA. L. REV.]. A single-member district elects only
one representative. D. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTION LAws 19 (1967).
403 U.S. 124 (1971).
489 F.2d at 274, citing 403 U.S. at 156-60.
403 U.S. at 144.
,2 Id. at 159-60.
'3 Id. at 157. See also Comment, 26 ALA. L. REv. at 174-75. Criticism has focused
on two theoretical effects of multi-member districts. One criticism is that in a state
legislature elected under a combination of single- and multi-member districting, the
power of voters from the different districts varies sharply at the same time that propor-
tional representation appears to be equal. 403 U.S. at 144-47. For example, under a
mathematical definition of voting power, the power of a voter in a single-member
district with a voting population of ten is less than that of a voter in a four-man district
representing forty voters. See Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts-Do They
Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle, 75 YALE L.J. 1309, 1314-24 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Banzhaf]. A second criticism is that minorities tend to be sub-
merged and the majority tends to be over-represented in such districts. 403 U.S. at
144, 158-59.
" Plaintiffs challenging infringement of voting rights must bear the burden of
proving their allegations. 403 U.S. at 149-53, citing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
765-66 (1973).
15 489 F.2d at 274; cf. 403 U.S. at 149-50.
489 F.2d at 274, citing Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965). In Fortson
the Court held that equal protection did not necessarily require the state's legislative
apportionment scheme to be made up entirely of single-member districts. Id. at 438.
The Court noted that a claim of minority discrimination had not been made and left
open the possible validity of such a claim. Id. at 439.
'7 489 F.2d at 274, citing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766-70 (1973), discussed
at note 24 and accompanying text infra.
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Therefore, the plaintiffs' constitutional claim was invalid. 8
Since members of the Wilmington and New Hanover County gov-
ernmental bodies and school boards are elected at-large from their
respective governmental units," and since at-large election is essen-
tially the same as multi-member"0 district election,21 the plaintiffs
could have selected the at-large provision for challenge.2 Although
the Supreme Court held in 1971 that multi-member districts for a
state legislature were not per se unconstitutional,2 in 1973 it held
such districting unconstitutional in a Texas county where there had
been a persistent history of minority exclusion practices. 24 Following
the lead of the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit recently held for
plaintiffs in two cases challenging at-large districting for local govern-
mental bodies, finding that the plans unconstitutionally minimized
the access of the black community to the political process. 25 Simi-
larly, if it could have been shown that in Wilmington and New Hano-
ver County dilution of the minority voting power had in fact moti-
11 The Fourth Circuit's terse and unequivocal opinion exemplifies the general
attitude of courts when examining constitutional challenges to voting schemes when
such challenges are buttressed only by mathematical arguments and lacking in evi-
dence of discrimination. See generally Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 146; Banzhaf
at 1324; Casper, Apportionment and the Right to Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny,
1973 SuPREmE CouRT REvIEw 1, 24-29 (1973).
" 489 F.2d at 273 n.1.
2 See note 8 supra.
11 Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191, 194 n.8 (5th Cir. 1973), citing Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1315 (5th Cir. 1973) (Clark, J., dissenting). See also Kilgar-
lin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 123-24 & n.2, rehearing denied, 386 U.S. 999 (1967); Comment,
26 ALA. L. REv. 163 & n.4.
22 The possible improper effect of an at-large election scheme discussed as the
second criticism in note 13 supra is the one which would have been relevant in Cherry
and which has supported successful plaintiffs' cases in recent suits. See notes 24-25
and accompanying text infra. Comment on the dissimilar features of multi-member
legislative districts and local at-large election districts in Brodhead v. Ezell, 348 F.
Supp. 1244, 1250 (S.D. Ala. 1972), supports the vulnerability to constitutional chal-
lenge of at-large districting of local governmental bodies.
2 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 159-60.
24 White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 768-69 (1973). The critical factors indicative
of discrimination in Bexar County, Texas, were poll tax and the "most restrictive voter
registration procedures in the nation." Id. at 768. But cf. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S.
315, 330-33 (1973) (multi-member districting approved as a remedy for other inequi-
ties).
25 Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 1973); Zimmer v. McKeithen,
485 F.2d 1297, 1307 (5th Cir. 1973), noted in Comment, 26 ALA. L. Rlv. 163. These
suits challenged proposed reapportionment plans for school boards and police juries
in two Louisiana parishes. The two cases were different in that Zimmer disapproved
of an at-large district in which blacks were in the majority, id. at 1309, while Turner
disapproved one in which blacks were in the minority, 490 F.2d at 192.
1975]
432 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII





B. Discriminatory Dismissal of Public School Teachers on the
Basis of National Teacher Examination Scores-United States v.
Chesterfield County School District, 484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973);
Walston v. School Board, 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974).
The Fourth Circuit recently decided two cases determining
whether the fourteenth amendment' rights of black teachers were
denied by their dismissals from teaching positions on the basis of
National Teacher Examination (NTE)2 scores. In both cases, United
States v. Chesterfield County School District3 from South Carolina,
and Walston v. School Board4 from Nansemond County, Virginia,
local boards had been effectuating court-ordered desegregation plans.
In the process, the boards reallocated students, terminated teacher
28 Courts have acknowledged that majorities have sometimes attempted to fortify
their electoral advantage by statutory devices designed to mitigate or eliminate the
effects of minority concentration of votes, or bloc voting, in at-large or multi-member
districts. Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1973), citing White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) and Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973).
See also Barnett, Unitary-Multiple Election Districts, 39 AM. POL. SCL REv. 65, 66
(1945). The "single shot" vote, in which a voter in an at-large election casts only one
of several votes allowed him, BALLENTINE's LAW DiCroNARY 1183 (3d ed. 1969), is one
method by which any group may attempt to intensify its power at the polls. "Single
shot" effectiveness requires that only one candidate from a given bloc run for a position
and that all members of that bloc vote only for that candidate. Devices protective
against such bloc voting, including a prohibition of single shot voting, were operative
in some governmental units in North Carolina until July 1, 1973, when legislative
amendment eliminated them pursuant to a federal court ruling that they were uncon-
stitutional. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-117, -151 & Annot. (Supp. 1973).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in pertinent part:
No State ... shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.
2 The National Teacher Examination is a standardized test used in many teacher
training colleges and in some teacher certification programs. The Educational Testing
Service of Princeton, New Jersey, which produces the tests, specifically advises that
the NTE scores contribute little to evaluation of experienced teachers and therefore
should not be considered in determining whether to retain such teachers. Walston v.
County School Bd., 492 F.2d 919, 924 n.4 (4th Cir. 1974).
3 484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973).
4 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974).
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stations, and did not rehire some teachers for 1970-71.1 The majority
of the teachers released on the basis of NTE scores were black.,
The challenged teacher dismissals were linked differently to NTE
scores in the two counties. The Nansemond County school authority
administered the NTE for the first time after the 1969-70 school year
and then only to new teachers hired and to those transferring7 be-
tween schools in the system. A minimum score was required for initial
employment or for reemployment following transfer.' In South Caro-
lina, however, NTE scores had been used for several years to grade
teaching certificates issued by the State Board of Education. Candi-
dates were graded from "A" through "D" depending upon the best
NTE score made by the applicant before certification. The certifi-
cate, once issued, was valid indefinitely, but over the years the mini-
mum score required for each grade certificate had been raised. Thus,
a teacher with a more recent "C" certificate might have achieved a
higher score than a teacher holding an older "B" rating. The policy
applied in the Chesterfield County system beginning in 1970 was not
to rehire "C" certificate teachers for the new term when teachers with
higher graded certificates were available.1
In both cases the Fourth Circuit overruled the district courts and
held that the application of NTE scores in the dismissal procedure
was discriminatory." The appeals court ordered reinstatement with
back pay for teachers terminated on the basis of NTE scores, except
for specified individuals whose dismissals were otherwise found to be
"for cause."" Although each case was initiated under the equal pro-
' Id. at 921-22; 484 F.2d at 71-72.
' In Nansemond County, fifteen black and two white teachers were released as a
result of low NTE scores. Seventy percent of 21 black teachers who took the test and
two percent of 106 white teachers failed. 492 F.2d at 922. In Chesterfield County, nine
black and nd white teachers were released as a result of the policy. Fifteen black and
eleven white teachers were retained who had NTE scores identical to or lower than the
nine black teachers released. 484 F.2d at 72.
7The facts are not clear as to whether this policy effectively required a greater
proportion of black teachers than white teachers to take the test.
492 F.2d at 921.
484 F.2d at 71-72, 75, & App. A.
10 492 F.2d at 926-27; 484 F.2d at 75.
" 492 F.2d at 926-27; 484 F.2d at 76. The Nansemond County case was remanded
for a determination of whether the "for cause" dismissals were appropriate under the
Fourth Circuit holding that the school board had the burden of proving that the
dismissals were not linked to discrimination. The facts of the "for cause" dismissals
were not given. Injunctive and any further relief deemed necessary by the lower court
was also authorized. 492 F.2d at 927.
In the Chesterfield County case, the dismissal of one teacher "for cause" was
affirmed on the basis of the Fourth Circuit's finding that the evidence upon which the
1975]
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tection clause of the fourteenth amendment, 2 the court in both opin-
ions cited two lines of authority, one based on constitutional interpre-
tation 3 and the other based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,1 which specifically prohibits racial discrimination in employ-
ment.
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the same standard by
which employment testing practices challenged under Title VII could
be validated would also serve as a standard of validity in contitu-
tional challenges of such practices. 5 With this acknowledgement, the
court was prepared to apply the holding of a Title VII case, Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., '0 to the constitutional challenges of teacher dismiss-
als based on NTE scores. In Griggs, the Supreme Court examined the
validity of requiring a high school diploma or a minimum intelligence
test score 7 as a condition of employment in, or transfer between,
various jobs at a power plant. 8 The Court in Griggs explained that
once a plaintiff had established that employment testing practices
operated to exclude blacks, the burden was shifted to the defendant
employer to demonstrate a manifest relationship between the tests
and job performance. 9
In addition to relying on the Griggs rationale, the Fourth Circuit
also relied upon authority stemming from its earlier constitutional
decision in Chambers v. Board of Education,0 a case involving the
discharge of a disproportionate number of black teachers incident to
district court had acted demonstrated that the teacher lacked professional competence
and that the administrative decision to dismiss her was not racially motivated. 484
F.2d at 75-76. Back pay ordered was to be mitigated in the amount of earnings from
any actual or reasonably available interim employment, and lost benefits and privi-
leges were to be reinstated. Id. at 76.
12 492 F.2d at 921; 484 F.2d at 73.
'3 See text accompanying notes 20-22 infra.
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970). Title VII was amended in 1972 to extend
coverage to state and local government employees. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2 (Mar. 24,
1972), 86 Stat. 103, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Thus, the claims could not initially
have been based upon the statutory prohibitions.
'5 484 F.2d at 73.
" 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Fourth Circuit had already reached other employment
practice decisions based on Griggs. See Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134,
138 (4th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) allows "professionally developed" ability tests
which are not intended to discriminate as to race.
" 401 U.S. at 425-26.
' Id. at 431-32. See also Note, Employment Testing: The Aftermath of Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 72 COLUM. L. REv. 900 (1972).
- 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966).
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desegregation.2 In Chambers the court adopted the principle that
once a plaintiff had established racially discriminatory effects in a
teacher dismissal policy, the burden was shifted to the defendant
school authority to show "by clear and convincing evidence" that the
policy of teacher dismissal was accompanied by no discriminatory
intent.
22
While the Fourth Circuit discussed both of these lines of authority
in the Chesterfield County case,2 3 it stated that evidence bearing on
the relationship of NTE scores to job performance was contradictory.
Since the Griggs burden could therefore not be satisfied and, further,
since the lower court had found proof supporting only a "reasonably
related" connection between the NTE scores and teacher perform-
ance, the appeals court left the Griggs question unresolved. 24 Instead,
it based its conclusion on a finding that the unevenly applied rating
criterion, which allowed retention of twenty-six teachers with NTE
scores equal to or lower than those of some of the black teachers who
had not been rehired,2 was "inherently capricious. '2 The court held
that such a policy obviously constituted unequal treatment and ren-
dered academic any discussion of rational standards. The result was
that the defendants had not satisfied the Chambers "clear and con-
vincing" standard of no discriminatory intent.Y
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in the Nansemond County case
was faced with allegations by the defendants that "there were valid
reasons for the use of the test" and therefore no inference of discrim-
21 Id. at 190-91.
22 Id. at 192; accord, Baker v. Municipal Separate School Dist., 462 F.2d 1112,
1114 (5th Cir. 1972); N.C. Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 393 F.2d 736 (4th Cir.
1968). The N. C. Teachers opinion outlines prior fourteenth amendment holdings of the
Fourth Circuit relating to dismissals of black teachers. Id. at 739 & n.1. The Supreme
Court in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), adopted the burden-
shifting principle, requiring the school authorities to show by clear and convincing
evidence that school redistricting plans which had racially discriminatory effects had
no discriminatory intent. Id. at 208. Keyes expressed approval of the Fourth Circuit's
application of the burden-shifting principle in Chambers. Id. at 208-10.
2 484 F.2d at 72-73.
2, Id. at 74-75. The Griggs opinion uses both "manifest relationship," 401 U.S. at
432, and "demonstrably a reasonable measure," id. at 436, to state the standard of
connection to be proved between test and job requirements. See note 38 and accompa-
nying text infra.
25 Id. at 75. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
1, 484 F.2d at 75, citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
484 F.2d at 75. In Chambers, the school board attempted "to justify failure to
hire some teachers with years of experience" by offering in evidence their low NTE
scores, but the court did not accept the scores inter alia as clear and convincing
evidence of no discriminatory intent. 364 F.2d at 191.
23 492 F.2d at 924.
19751
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inatory intent could be drawn. The Fourth Circuit drew upon the
Chambers logic in finding that the original inference of discrimina-
tion arose with the dismissal of disproportionate numbers of black
teachers and the burden then shifted to the school authority to show
by "clear and convincing evidence" that segregative intent was not a
factor in the dismissal policy. 29 Rather than confront the issue of
whether the evidence adduced fulfilled this burden, the Fourth Cir-
cuit held under the Griggs rationale that "a demonstrable relation-
ship" between the NTE and teacher performance had not been
shown."0
Since the two standards of proof established by Griggs and
Chambers were used conjunctively by the Fourth Circuit in these
cases, the assumption naturally arises that the court found a logical
connection between the two authorities. The Fourth Circuit stated in
general terms that the standards for decision are equivalent for statu-
tory and constitutional challenges to racially discriminatory employ-
ment practices." The court did not, however, express specific equiva-
lence between the Griggs and Chambers standards. The Nansemond
County decision implied that the Chambers absence of discrimina-
tion burden was fulfilled only if the Griggs manifest relationship was
proved. 32 Conversely, the Chesterfield County decision illustrated
that a failure to meet the Griggs burden was not the only factor which
could cause failure to meet the Chambers burden.3 Thus, the two
views are logically compatible.3
" Id. at 924-25.
3 Id. at 927. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
1, 484 F.2d at 73.
2 The defense in the Nansemond County case suggested that proof of no discrimi-
natory intent was equivalent to proof of a positive relationship between test and job
performance, but the court did not express agreement or disagreement with the propo-
sition. Id. A statement of equivalence between the two standards is found in the
district court opinion in the Walston case. United States v. County School Bd., 351 F.
Supp. 196, 203 & n.3 (E.D. Va. 1972).
484 F.2d at 75, citing Wright v. Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972), which held
that discriminatory effect invalidates state action notwithstanding absence of discrim-
inatory purpose.
3 Logical compatibility between Griggs and Chambers seems less readily accepta-
ble if an additional assumption is brought into the comparison. After enunciating the
employer's burden to prove a manifest relationship between test and job performance,
Griggs added that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures . . . that operate as 'built-in' headwinds for minority groups
and are unrelated to measuring job capability." 401 U.S. at 432. On first glance this
statement appears to contradict Chambers, which established that clear and convinc-
ing evidence of no discriminatory intent can redeem a practice which effectively dis-
criminates. 364 F.2d at 192. On closer analysis, it appears that Griggs may have
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Nevertfieless, it is striking that the court in the Nansemond
County case found the failure of the defendants to meet the Griggs
burden a sufficient reason to hold against them,35 while the court in
the Chesterfield County case avoided grounding its holding on a simi-
lar failure of proof and resorted instead to the "inherently capricious"
concept .3 This difference in approach was apparently the result of
substantial conflict between the two opinions on a technical issue.3"
The Chesterfield County decision did not reach the issue of whether
the "reasonably related" relationship between test and job perform-
ance, which the lower court found, was the same as a "demonstrable"
or "manifest" relationship required by Griggs; the court indicated,
however, that the issue would have to be confronted in future cases.3
This problem was apparently a factor in the court's unwillingness to
decide the case on the Griggs basis. 9 The Nansemond County court,
on the other hand, stated unequivocally that the "demonstrable"
relationship standard of proof was much more rigorous than the "rea-
sonably necessary" relationship which the lower court found, thus
justifying its holding for the plaintiffs on a Griggs basis."
In spite of the different approaches in these cases, their similar
conclusions indicate that black teachers in recently desegregated
school districts may expect the teacher dismissal policies to be re-
vised to exclude any NTE score criterion. Although the decisions were
that the particular applications of NTE scores were discriminatory
intended to emphasize the difference between simple good intention or absence of bad
intention and that absence of discriminatory intent which must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence.
A similar view was expressed by the dissent in Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114
(4th Cir. 1974), citing Griggs, which contended that simple assertion of a non-
discriminatory motive should not be a sufficient defense for a seller's refusal to sell a
lot to a black purchaser. The Madison dissent recommended shifting the burden to the
defense to prove a rational or business purpose, thus paralleling the Griggs requirement
to show a manifest and demonstrable relationship between test and job performance.
Id. at 118.
35 492 F.2d at 926.
m 484 F.2d at 75. The facts in the Nansemond County case apparently would have
supported an "inherently capricious" finding as readily as did the Chesterfield County
facts; there was little consistency in application of the policy, and exceptions were the
rule. See 492 F.2d at 922-26.
3 Even though the Chesterfield County case was decided more than five months
earlier, the Nansemond County opinion did not refer to it. The two opinions were
written by different judges and were based upon the deliberations of separate panels.
484 F.2d at 74 n.6. The fact that the Griggs opinion may not be entirely clear,
see note 24 supra, may account for the Chesterfield court's perceiving this to be a
continuing issue.
Id. at 74-75.
0 492 F.2d at 924.
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and thus did not necessarily invalidate all uses of the NTE,4' it is
reasonable to assume that almost any NTE use in dismissals may be
held invalid, especially if courts hold, as the Fourth Circuit did in the
Nansemond County case, that a "reasonably related" relationship
between test and job performance does not satisfy the requirements
of Griggs. Since the court accepted or conditionally accepted "for
cause" dismissals,42 the more flexible methods of evaluating profes-
sional competence, such as the recommendations of principals and
supervisors, would apparently still be viable.13 The courts' responses
to challenges of dismissals based on such subjective criteria would,
however, have to be on a case-by-case basis.4
L.D.S.
C. Revocation of Teacher's Certification Must Comply With
Standards of Procedural Due Process-Huntley v. North Carolina
State Board of Education, 493 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1974).
In Huntley v. North Carolina State Board of Education,' the
plaintiff, Mrs. Oliva S. Huntley, had been employed as a teacher by
the Lumberton City Board of Education for the 1967-68 school year.
The employment was pursuant to certification of Mrs. Huntley by
the North Carolina State Board of Education as evidenced by the
issuance of a teacher's certificate. Mrs. Huntley began teaching in
September of 1967, but on October 9, she was informed by the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction that the Attorney General's off-
ice had determined that she was not entitled to the teacher's certifi-
cate because she had obtained it by fraud. The letter to Mrs. Huntley
stated that: "On the basis of this advice, I [the State Superintend-
ent] am declaring invalid the Grammar Grade Certificate that was
issued in your name on May 3, 1967. ' '2 Although she was never for-
mally discharged, Mrs. Huntley's pay was terminated on November
' Id. at 927; 484 F.2d at 75.
42 See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
" 484 F.2d at 76. In Vance v. Board of School Trustees, No. 73-2312 (4th Cir. Oct.
2, 1974), a dismissal of a black teacher, based largely on assessment of her qualifica-
tions and performance by school professionals, was upheld.
41 See 492 F.2d at 927; 484 F.2d at 76.
493 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1974).
2 Brief for Appellant at 5, Huntley v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 493 F.2d
1016 (4th Cir. 1974).
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20, and this was admitted to be tantamount to discharge.'
Mrs. Huntley retained counsel, who wrote to the Attorney Gen-
eral's office on November 27 and requested information concerning
the charges. On November 30, the Attorney General's office re-
sponded by outlining the charges and evidence, but refused to furnish
the report of the State Bureau of Investigation without a court order.
On this same date, the school board's counsel sent a registered letter
to Mrs. Huntley, informing her that on December 7, the State Board
of Education would afford her a hearing. This notice stated that an
investigation had
disclosed information from which the Superintendent of Pub-
lic Instruction in his capacity as Secretary to the North Caro-
lina State Board of Education is satisfied that Olivia S. Hunt-
ley was not the same individual who took the March 18, 1967
National Teacher's Examination and having so satisfied him-
self on October 9th, 1967 notified Oliva S. Huntley. . .that
the Grammar Grade Certificate issued to her on May 3rd, 1967
as a result of the score reported on the March 18th, 1967 ad-
ministration of the National Teacher's Examination, was de-
clared invalid.4
The notice further provided that Mrs. Huntley could appear at the
December 7 hearing "to show cause, if any she has, why the North
Carolina State Board of Education should reinstate the Grammar
Grade Certificate issued in her name on May 3, 1967 and subse-
quently declared invalid on October 9, 1967."1 In response, Mrs.
Huntley's counsel wrote on December 4, that the October 9 ex parte
invalidation of the certificate denied the plaintiff due process of law.
Furthermore, the fact that Mrs. Huntley had to show cause why she
should be reinstated further enhanced the constitutional deprivation
by placing the burden of proof on her. Thus, Mrs. Huntley's counsel
informed the Board that the plaintiff would not appear at the hearing
because such participation would be an admission that the October
9 revocation was valid.
On December 5, the Attorney General's office sent to the plain-
tiff's counsel additional information concerning the charges against
Mrs. Huntley and stated that the hearing would proceed on Decem-
ber 7 as scheduled. The letter failed to mention whether Mrs. Hunt-
ley would have the burden of proof. The hearing took place on Decem-
ber 7 without Mrs. Huntley or her attorney, and, after the govern-
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ment had introduced evidence pertaining to the charges against Mrs.
Huntley, the Board of Education revoked her certificate. Mrs. Hunt-
ley then brought suit against the Board of Education in the district
court on the theory that both the ex parte invalidation and the subse-
quent hearing denied her due process of law. When that court denied
her injunctive relief and damages, she appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit employed a two-step process in holding that
the procedures used to invalidate Mrs. Huntley's certificate denied
her due process. Initially, the court had to determine the effect of the
ex parte invalidation of October 9. Since Mrs. Huntley had a property
interest in her contract to teach,6 and since the charges of fraud
placed her reputation and honor at stake, the court reasoned that the
plaintiff was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard.' Con-
sequently, the Board's action in invalidating the plaintiffs certificate
without giving notice was deemed unconstitutional.'
The question then became whether the December 7 hearing ade-
quately cured the unconstitutional ex parte invalidation. In holding
that it did not, the court of appeals found the December 7 hearing
deficient for two reasons. Most importantly, the court reasoned that
the notice of the December 7 hearing was inadequate. As pointed out
by the court of appeals, "the Due Process Clause. . . at a minimum
• . .require[s] that deprivation of. . .property by adjudication be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case." 9 Since the plaintiff had a property interest in her
employment contract," she was entitled to adequate notice. The no-
tice that Mrs. Huntley received was a show cause order, which, if
properly worded, could have constituted sufficient notice. In Shirer
6 As stated by the Supreme Court in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972):
[t]he Couit has held that a public college professor dismissed from
an office held under tenure provisions [citations omitted], and col-
lege professors and staff members dismissed during the terms of their
contracts [citations omitted], have interests in continued employ-
ment that are safeguarded by due process.
Id. at 576-77.
7 [Wihere a person's good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential.
Id. at 573, citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
8 See notes 6 & 7 supra. The district court also found that the ex parte invalidation
had denied Mrs. Huntley due process. 493 F.2d at 1018-19.
1 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965), citing Mullane v. Central Hano-
ver Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
"* See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
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v. Anderson," the district court held a show cause order sufficient to
meet the notice requirement where the order was "to show cause...
why the certificate should not be revoked."'" However, the Fourth
Circuit stressed that Mrs. Huntley's notice provided that she should
show cause why she should be reinstated.'3 The court of appeals,
therefore, found that the show cause order did not meet the Shirer
test since the notice implicitly stated that Mrs. Huntley's fraud had
already been established and that the ex parte invalidation of Octo-
ber 9 was proper. Thus, she was given merely the opportunity to prove
that the invalidation was improper. A fortiori, Mrs. Huntley would
have been required to sustain the burden of proving that the invalida-
tion was unjustified. As stated by the Fourth Circuit:
[The differences between the notice approved in Shirer and
the notice in this case are more fundamental than semantic.
The notice in this case heralded a proceeding that was mistak-
enly premised on an unconstitutional invalidation of Mrs.
Huntley's certificate. Building on this untenable foundation,
it indicated that Mrs. Huntley would have the burden of prov-
ing the October 9 invalidation was unwarranted."
" 88 F. Supp. 858 (E.D.S.C. 1950).
' Id. at 861 (emphasis added).
" See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
" 493 F.2d at 1019. Note the district court's analysis of a similar problem that was
raised in Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), affd, 407
F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969):
[U]nder their contention that they have been denied due process, the
plaintiffs assert that they were in fact expelled without a hearing and
that when hearings were actually held, the F.A.C. was considering
whether to "readmit" plaintiffs. The plaintiffs make much of the fact
that the annonunced purpose of the F.A.C. in holding the hearings
was stated as being whether to "readmit" plaintiffs and that, there-
fore, the burden of proof was placed upon the plaintiffs to convince
the F.A.C. that they should be readmitted.
S. . [The purpose of the hearing is to determine whether the
charges are true. Disciplinary proceedings conducted by an educa-
tional institution are not to be tested according to the niceties of
procedure required in a court of law. Inquiry into the technicalities
governing burden of proof in civil or criminal trials is, therefore, irrele-
vant. This phase of plaintiffs' argument resolves itself basically into
an unfounded argument of semantics brought about by the use of the
word "readmit" by the F.A.C. In an administrative proceeding the
"demands of due process do not require a hearing, at the initial stage
or at any particular point or at more than one point. . . so long as
the requisite hearing is held before the final order becomes effective."
Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941).
279 F. Supp. at 202. The district court in Huntley agreed that the distinction was one
of semantics. Appendix of Brief for Appellant at 59, Huntley v. North Carolina State
Bd. of Educ., 493 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1974).
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Having determined that the notice was inadequate, 5 the court of
appeals then considered the procedure of the December 9 hearing
itself. The court found that the purpose of the hearing changed from
a determination of reinstatement to one of revocation. Initially, the
hearing had convened with the expressed purpose of deciding whether
Mrs. Huntley should be reinstated. This was evidenced by the staff
Attorney General's opening statement, which stated that:
" In his letter of December 4, Mrs. Huntley's attorney protested the shifting of
the burden of proof presented by the notice as a denial of due process. Accordingly,
he refused to participate in the December 7 hearing. The court of appeals found that
his absence was not a waiver of procedural irregularities, even though it could have
been so construed under Harris v. Smith, 418 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1969), which the court
cited as opposing authority. Instead, the December 4 letter "amounted to a special
appearance fully setting forth the reasons why she claimed she was denied due process
by the ex parte invalidation of October 9 and why she protested the indicated shift in
the burden of proof." 493 F.2d at 1019. The court of appeals cited no authority for its
proposition that the December 4 letter amounted to a special appearance, one made
solely for the purpose of challenging the court's jurisdiction without thereby submit-
ting to the personal jurisdiction of the court, and usually evidenced by a motion to
dismiss or to quash service. There appears to be no jurisdictional issue in Huntley.
Furthermore, as to the failure to appear, the authorities are contra. Three of the cases
cited by the court specifically state that due process entitles the plaintiff to an
opportunity to be heard. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573
(1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914) (the fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard). Once
the plaintiff has notice of the hearing, then it is his decision whether to attend. A
failure to attend, as in Huntley, would appear to be a waiver. Thus, in Harris v. Smith,
418 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1969), where the appellant, Harris, chose to absent himself from
a hearing, the Second Circuit stated: "Since Harris was informed of the matter pend-
ing and could choose for himself whether to appear or default, contest or acquiesce,
due process notice requirements were met." Id. at 901. Similarly, in Sigma Chi Fra-
ternity v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Col. 1966), the court
rejected the plaintiffs' contention that they were not given adequate notice: "They did
not avail themselves of the opportunity to make a showing. . . . The important ques-
tion is whether the plaintiffs were given an opportunity to be heard." Id. at 528.
It seems that there would be no less a waiver in Huntley even though the notice
may have been procedurally deficient. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), the Supreme Court stated the necessary elements of notice:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to pres-
ent their objections.
Id. at 314. Certainly Mrs. Huntley was apprised of the pendency of the action by the
notice that the Board sent her. Furthermore, the very purpose of the notice was to let
her come to the hearing to "present her objections." Thus, it appears that the court of
appeals should not have allowed the December 4 letter to be a substitute for Mrs.
Huntley's appearance, and further should have held that the notice was, in fact,
adequate.
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The purpose of this hearing is to present evidence ... so that
[the State Board of Education] may determine whether a
. . .certificate issued to Mrs. Oliva S. Huntley. .. on May
3, 1967, and revoked by letter of October 9, 1967, .... should
be reinstated."
However, the staff Attorney General stated at the conclusion of the
hearing that:
[R]evocation of Mrs. Huntley's certificate on October 9, 1967,
was in fact justified, and. . . this Board should reaffirm that
particular revocation."
Thus, the proceeding turned into a revocation hearing, which was
precisely what Mrs. Huntley's attorney had been insisting that she
was entitled to. This, however, was deemed inadequate to afford her
due process, because the board "changed its procedure in midstream
without giving her notice of its intentions." The Board concluded the
hearing with a resolution that Mrs. Huntley's certificate was "re-
voked now, effective as of the date of issuance. ... " The court of
appeals further noted that the Board "did not vote on Mrs.-Huntley's
reinstatement, as its notice indicated it would.""0
The Fourth Circuit relied on Armstrong v. Manzo2' to support its
decision that the subsequent hearing did not cure the unconstitu-
tional October 9 invalidation. In Armstrong, the child's natural
mother and stepfather failed to give the natural father any notice of
adoption proceedings. Under Texas law, if the father did not substan-
tially contribute to the child's support for a two year period, his
" 493 F.2d at 1020 (emphasis added).
" Id. (emphasis added).
IS Id.
"Id.
2 Id. It appears by this statement that the court of appeals is being inconsistent.
It would seem, according to the court's analysis, that it makes no difference whether
the Board voted on Mrs. Huntley's reinstatement as the notice said it would, since the
notice was constitutionally deficient in the first place. Furthermore, it is illogical to
interpret the court's statement as meaning that the hearing would have been proper
had the Board done what it said it was going to do in the notice, i.e., vote on reinstate-
ment. This is so because if the proceeding centered on reinstatement, then Mrs. Hunt-
ley would have been denied due process in that she would have had to have borne the
burden of proof. Thus, under the court's analysis, the Board of Education loses two
ways-(l) The proceeding was deficient because the Board gave notice that it would
vote on reinstatement, but voted instead on revocation; and (2) the proceeding was
deficient because the Board voted on revocation as required by due process, but did
not given notice of such action-it only gave notice that it would vote on reinstatement.
21 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
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consent to the adoption was not necessary." The mother presented
an affidavit to a juvenile judge that the natural father had not con-
tributed to the child's support and the juvenile judge gave his consent
to the adoption. When the father learned of the adoption, he brought
suit to set aside the adoption and a full hearing was held. The father's
evidence that he had supported the child was rejected by the court
and the adoption was confirmed. On appeal, the United States Su-
preme Court reversed and held that the subsequent hearing given to
the father did not cure the due process defect of the earlier adoption
proceedings. The Supreme Couit found that at the subsequent hear-
ing, the burden was placed on the father to prove that he had pro-
vided adequate support for the child, while at the initial adoption
hearing the burden of proof was on the natural mother. The Supreme
Court stated that:
The trial court could have fully accorded this right [the oppor-
tunity to be heard] to the petitioner only by granting his mo-
tion to set aside the decree and consider the case anew. Only
that would have wiped the slate clean. Only that would have
restored the petitioner to the position he would have occupied
had due process of law been accorded to him in the first place.2
The appellee in Huntley argued, in effect, that Armstrong was in-
applicable since the state had assumed the burden of proof by pres-
enting evidence of the plaintiff's alleged fraud.2 4 The Fourth Circuit,
however, found in Huntley that part of the evidence presented was
the invalid revocation of October 9, which the Board had never de-
clared unlawful. Thus, the Board had not "wiped the slate clean."
In conclusion, the court of appeals found "that the defective notice,
the change in the purpose of the meeting without further notice, and
the failure of the Board to recognize the invalidity of the October 9
revocation, denied Mrs. Huntley due process of law."
The conclusion of the Fourth Circuit appears to be based primar-
ily upon its determination that the notice sent to Mrs. Huntley by
the Board of Education was insufficient. It seems arguable, however,
that the notice was adequate, having met all of the necessary require-
ments.26 Assuming arquendo that the notice was deficient, Mrs.
Huntley was nevertheless put on notice of the hearing. The purpose
' Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. ART. 46a (1969).
23 380 U.S. at 552.
2, See Brief for Appellee at 14, Huntley v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 493
F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1974).
2 493 F.2d at 1020.
28 See note 15 supra.
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of the notice was to afford Mrs. Huntley an "opportunity to present
[her] objections." She was accorded this opportunity. Had she
appeared at the hearing, she would have found that it did not center
on reinstatement, but on revocation, and the instant lawsuit could
have been avoided.
Furthermore, there is authority for the proposition that it was
immaterial whether "reinstatement" or "revocation" was used in the
notice.2 The Fourth Circuit relied on this distinction to show that the
burden of proof had been improperly placed on Mrs. Huntley. How-
ever, since the purpose of an administrative hearing is "to determine
whether the charges are true . . .. [i]nquiry into the technicalities
governing burden of proof in civil. . . trials is. . . irrelevant."29 The
court of appeals itself stated that "[t]he proceedings of a board of
education need not be conducted with the scrupulous regard for pro-
cedural niceties that the law imposes on courts.""9 Hence, the court's
reliance on Armstrong seems misplaced because in that case the Su-
preme Court adopted a requirement of procedural "niceties" applica-
ble only to civil cases.3'
Furthermore, Mrs. Huntley's absence should have constituted a
waiver of her objections.2 Since her reason for not appearing was that
she would have to assume the burden of proof, and since that argu-
ment is irrelevant in an administrative hearing, then she had no
legitimate basis for failing to make an appearance.
The court of appeals premised its decision on two incompatible
propositions. On one hand, the court reasoned that the notice and
procedure of the December 9 hearing was deficient from a due process
standpoint. However, the court also recognized in passing that the
procedural technicalities imposed on courts of law are not necessarily
applicable to administrative proceedings. Had the Fourth Circuit
recognized the full implications of the latter, the result would neces-
sarily have been that Mrs. Huntley was not denied due process of law.
S.D.R.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). See
note 15 supra.
See note 14 supra.
" Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 202 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd,
407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969). See note 14 supra.
493 F.2d at 1019.
"It is also to be noted that in Huntley the government did, in fact, assume the
burden of proof. Id. at 1020.
" See note 15 supra.
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D. Due Process Guarantees in the Termination of Doctor's Staff
Privilege at a Private Hospital-Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency
Hospital Association, 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974).
In Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Association,' the
Fourth Circuit considered the extent to which the requirements of
procedural due process of law applied to termination of a doctor's
staff privileges at a private hospital. On the basis of the fourteenth
amendment 2 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 3 the Fourth Circuit
held that the doctor was entitled to a hearing before his privileges
were terminated and set out guidelines to insure that any future
hearing conducted by the hospital board met the requirements of due
process of law.'
The litigation arose after the hospital board, alleging multiple
infractions of hospital rules and regulation, terminated the doctor's
staff privileges without affording him a hearing. The doctor brought
suit in the district court seeking damages and reinstatement, and the
court granted an interlocutory injunction preventing termination of
his privileges until a hearing had been held. A hearing was duly
convened by the board at which the doctor was allowed to defend
himself against four specific charges. In addition to these, however,
the board alleged 32 unspecified infractions, the merits of which the
doctor was not allowed to contest. Because of an impasse over the
question of his right to contest the additional charges and to use the
hospital's records bearing on those charges, the doctor withdrew from
the hearing; and his termination was subsequently approved. The
496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
The applicability of this section to conduct such as that challenged in this case is
triggered by the presence of "state action."
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunites secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other possible
proceeding for redress.
The applicability of this amendment is triggered by conduct "under color of state
law."
1 496 F.2d at 180.
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district court denied the doctor further injunctive relief on the ground
that he had waived due process protection by withdrawing from the
hearing.5
The Fourth Circuit refused to accept the argument of waiver,
finding on the facts that the plaintiff had strenuously asserted his
rights while present at the hearing and had not withdrawn in ac-
quiescence to the relinquishment of those rights, but rather in protest
over their continued denial.6 The fact that the doctor was afforded no
opportunity to contest the merits of the long list of additional charges
was a critical element in the court's finding that due process had been
denied.
7
The Fourth Circuit ordered restoration of the doctor's staff privi-
leges unless the board afforded him a hearing within such reasonable
time as the district court might specify.' The court also set out guide-
lines to insure that the hearing would conform to the requirements
of due process The guidelines offered were that: (1) there must be a
hearing before final action is taken; (2) the hearing must begin anew
without reference to any past proceeding;"5 (3) the hearing must be
held only on clear accusations of which the accused had notice and
for which he had time to prepare answers, although any charges
which had been brought previously in a due process hearing would
not have to be reheard; (4) the accused must have access to all perti-
nent records in possession of the dismissing authority; (5) the accused
must have the right to present evidence in his own favor, to rebut
evidence against him, and to cross-examine; and (6) the powers of
prosecutor, judge, and jury should not all be lodged within one hear-
ing body."
Id. at 176-79.
6 Id. at 179-80. An essential factor in the doctor's favor was that he had promptly
resorted to the court for enforcement of his rights. In other cases where voluntary choice
was exercised in refusing to participate in a hearing, and no prompt claim was asserted
thereafter, the default evidenced waiver. Id., citing Harris v. Smith, 418 F.2d 899, 901
(2d Cir. 1969).
7 496 F.2d at 180.
'Id.
' Id. at 178-81, citing Milford v. People's Community Hosp. Authority, 380 Mich.
49, 155 N.W.2d 835, 839-40 (1968) (outlining procedural requirements).
11 496 F.2d at 180, citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (meaningful
opportunity to be heard requires fresh proceedings which do not refer to previous
unconstitutionally established decisions).
" An additional requirement was that the accused could not defend himself by
countercharges against other doctors. 496 F.2d at 181, citing Woodbury v. McKinnon,
447 F.2d 839, 845-46 (5th Cir. 1971) ("one who fails to meet the standard has not been
denied constitutional protection just because others have not likewise been held ac-
countable").
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The preliminary issue of whether the hospital's actions consti-
tuted state action or were under color of state law, as required by the
fourteenth amendment and the 1871 Civil Rights Act," was not dis-
cussed in detail by the Fourth Circuit. The court simply reasoned, as
had the district court, that the private hospital was subject to due
process requirements as a result of its receipt of federal, state, and
county funds. 3 In support of this position, the Fourth Circuit cited
its own prior holdings in which federal-state funding had provided
sufficient grounds for maintaining claims under the fourteenth
amendment.1 That this is not a settled issue, however, is indicated
by the recent opinion of the Southern District of New York in Barrett
v. United Hospital.5 In Barrett, the court described the issue of state
action as central to a doctor's challenge of a private hospital's denial
of his staff privileges."6 The Barrett opinion recommended a three-
pronged test to determine whether government funding constituted
state action. Under that test, state action would be found if the
funding was significant, had a nexus with the conduct complained of,
and furthered the challenged activity." The Barrett court used a
broad base of authority to support use of the test 8 and concluded that
the hospital's decision to terminate the doctor's staff privileges was
entirely free of state action implications and therefore was not subject
to federal judicial interference."
12 See notes 2 & 3 supra.
' 496 F.2d at 178. The Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 et seq. (1970), which
was a source of funds for the defendant hospital in Christhilf, allots federal monies to
assist states in furnishing needed hospital facitlites.
"1 496 F.2d at 178, citing Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th
Cir. 1969); Simpkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). See also Smith v. Hampton Training School for
Nurses, 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966); Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964).
12 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" Id. at 795.
" Id. at 979, 801.
" Id. at 797, citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972) (state
must have significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations for state benefits
to subject private entities to fourteenth amendment requirements); Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967); Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir. 1974)
(state action must be related to challenged activity); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493
F.2d 739, 741 (2d Cir. 1974) (must be joint activity of private person and state in
challenged conduct); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1968) (state funding
must be substantial).
11 376 F. Supp. at 805-06. The Barrett court analyzed the standards used in the
Second Circuit to subject private institutions to due process requirements, concluding
that only in cases of racial discrmination and traditionally governmental activities
would the three-pronged state action test be set aside. Id. at 796-805, citing Powe v.
Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968); Mulvihill v. Julia L. Butterfield Memorial Hosp.,
329 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
